New Life for the Death Tax Debate by Carter, Elizabeth R.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 1 Article 6 
December 2020 
New Life for the Death Tax Debate 
Elizabeth R. Carter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the Death Tax Debate, 90 Denv. U. L. Rev. 175 (2012). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please 
contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
NEW LIFE FOR THE DEATH TAX DEBATE
ELIZABETH R. CARTERt
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the ascendancy of wealth redistribution as the
policy underpinning the federal estate tax through the lens of sociology
and argues that by attempting to ensure equal access to the American
dream by penalizing only those who have fulfilled its promise, the feder-
al estate tax places fundamental American values in irreconcilable con-
flict. The reason that the current system does not work, I argue, is rooted
more in history and sociology than it is in economics. The solution is not
necessarily the repeal of the federal estate tax. Nor is the solution replac-
ing the estate tax with an inheritance tax, an accessions tax, or taxing
inheritances as income, as proposed by other commentators. The estate
tax plays, or should play, an important role in ensuring vertical and hori-
zontal equity in our federal tax system. Perhaps more importantly, it also
has the potential to provide a safety net of revenue during times of exi-
gency, such as that currently faced by our nation. In order to achieve
these goals, however, we must first correctly recognize the fundamental
problem with the current system. When the history of the tax is examined
from a sociological and historical vantage point, the real problem be-
comes clear.
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Pop Quiz. Which of the following quotes best describes the necessi-
ty of the federal estate tax?
(a) "Dynastic wealth, the enemy of a meritocracy, is on the rise.
Equality of opportunity has been on the decline .... A pro-
gressive and meaningful estate tax is needed to curb the
movement of a democracy toward plutocracy."
Warren Buffett'
(b) "[T]he death tax ... taxes income that has already been taxed
once before, and which encourages elaborate schemes for
transferring wealth."
-Mitt Romney2
(c) "The death tax results in the double taxation of many family
assets while hurting the source of most new jobs in this coun-
try-America's small business and farms."
-George W. Bush
(d) "I believe that those of us who have benefited so greatly from
our country's investment in our lives should be asked to give a
portion of our wealth back to invest in opportunities for the fu-
ture. Society has a just claim on our fortunes and that claim
goes by the name estate tax."
-Bill Gates Sr."
1. Kevin Drawbaugh, Buffett Backs Estate Tax, Decries Wealth Gap, REUTERS, Nov. 14,
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/14/us-buffett-congress-
idUSN1442383020071114 (quoting Warren Buffett).
2. Mitt Romney, Obama Would Tax Economy to Death, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 1, 2012, at
19.
3. Chelsea Trull, House Votes Down Federal Estate Taxes, MICH. DAILY, Apr. 13, 2005,




Feeling confused? Ambivalent? Outraged? Vindicated? In any case,
you are probably in good company. These men know how to pull at your
heartstrings. They intentionally framed the issue in terms of your core
values. How do they know what values are important to you? That part is
easy. Sociology tells us that Americans have a collective set of core val-
ues and that they use these values to evaluate political issues.' Politicians
and other public figures vying for our support on a particular issue know
this, and they will frame their particular stance in terms of these values.
However, when we are presented with the issue already framed in terms
of conflicting core values or conflicting interpretations of the same core
values, many of us become confused, fail to evaluate the issue ourselves,
or become ambivalent.6
The men in your pop quiz are not helping matters. All four men are
college-educated Americans.7 All four earned graduate degrees in law,
economics, or business.8 All four are millionaires, and at least one is a
billionaire.9 And yet, this seemingly homogenous group cannot agree on
the mere existence of the federal estate tax. They all framed the issue
slightly differently, and yet you likely felt some sort of emotional re-
sponse to each argument. That gut feeling you experience when con-
fronted with issues framed in terms of ideas like equality, democracy,
and opportunity is natural, but it is also the federal estate tax's biggest
problem.
This Article examines the ascendancy of wealth redistribution as the
policy underpinning the federal estate tax through the lens of sociology,
and argues that by attempting to ensure equal access to the American
4. Bill Gates, Sr., Strengthening the Estate Tax to Strengthen the Country, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 17, 2009, 6:16PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-gates-senior/strengthening-the-
estate b_396444,html.
5. See Paul R. Brewer, Values, Political Knowledge, and Public Opinion About Gay Rights,
67 PUB. OPINION. Q. 173, 173 (2003).
6. See id. at 177-78.
7. See About Mitt, Mirr ROMNEY, http://www.mittromney.com/learn/mitt (last visited Sept.
14, 2012); George W. Bush, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewbush (last visited Sept. 14, 2012); Warren
Buffett, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/warren-buffett-9230729 (last visited Sept.
14, 2012); William H. Gates, Sr., BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND.,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/leadership/Pages/william-gates-sr.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. See Steve Holland & Kim Dixon, Milt Romney Tax Returns Released: Paid Just 13.9%
Rate in 2010, Had Swiss Bank Account, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2012, 11:24PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/mitt-romney-tax-retums-released-n 1225247.html; The
Net Worth of the American Presidents: From Washington to Obama to _, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 9,
2012, 1:26PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/american-presidents-republican-candidates-net-
worth-2012-1?op=l; Warren Buffett, supra note 7. William H. Gates Sr.'s millionaire status is in-
ferred based upon his son's approximate net worth of $61 billion and status as the second wealthiest
person in the world, in addition to Gates Sr.'s professional background as a founding partner at K&L
Gates (formerly Preston Gates & Ellis), a Seattle law firm where partners averaged $890,000 in
profits in 2012. Cf Firm Profiles: K&L Gates, AM. LAW.,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/firmProfile.jsp?name=K%26L+Gates (last updated Jan. 1, 2012);
The World's Billionaires, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (Apr. 24, 2012); William H.
Gates, Sr., supra note 7.
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dream by penalizing only those who have fulfilled its promise, the feder-
al estate tax places fundamental American values in irreconcilable con-
flict. The reason that the current system does not work, I argue, is rooted
more in history and sociology than in economics. The solution is not
necessarily the repeal of the federal estate tax. Nor is the solution as sim-
ple as replacing the estate tax with an inheritance tax, implementing an
accessions tax, or taxing inheritances as income, as proposed by other
commentators.' 0 The estate tax plays, or should play, an important role in
ensuring vertical and horizontal equity in our federal tax system. Perhaps
more importantly, it also has the potential to provide a safety net of reve-
nue during times of financial exigency, such as that currently faced by
our nation. In order to achieve these goals, however, we must first cor-
rectly recognize the fundamental problem with the current system. When
the history of the tax is examined from a sociological and historical van-
tage point, the real problem becomes clear.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of any system of taxation is to raise revenue."
However, the federal estate tax, and by extension the federal gift tax, has
two concurrent goals. In addition to providing a source of revenue, the
tax promotes a supposedly important social goal of preventing "exces-
sive" accumulations of inherited wealth.12 This social aspect of the tax
pits conservatives and liberals against each other in an increasingly toxic
debate. Yet, the modem federal estate tax has not accomplished either
goal with much success.
Understanding the evolution of the wealth redistribution goal and
the public reaction to that goal is critical to understanding the futility of
the current debate and in analyzing how to move forward. The current
rhetoric surrounding the estate tax is no different from that of the past.
This Article argues that the real source of this debate is a conflict be-
tween several core American values. Regardless of where your personal
opinions may lie in this debate, the sociological history of the estate tax
reveals several truths: (1) we are unlikely to ever reach a consensus re-
garding the appropriateness of the supposed wealth redistribution policy;
(2) that policy is what converts a useful and potentially fair tax to a polit-
ically polarizing one; and (3) the estate tax has the potential to provide
much needed revenue during times of national exigency. To achieve this
potential, we must remove any wealth redistribution policy from the tax.
10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1178-79 (1978).
11. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Joseph J. Thomdike, What's the Estate Tax Supposed to Do, Anyway?,




Part II of this Article explores what sociologists call our "core
American values" and examines how these values affect our political
attitudes. Part III of this Article briefly summarizes the various methods
of taxing gratuitous property transfers at death. Part IV summarizes the
nature of a tax policy debate and argues that the federal estate tax debate
is somewhat unique. Part V examines the history of the federal estate tax
through a sociological lens in an effort to provide insight to the current
debate. Part V argues that the current debate can be traced back to two
sources, both of which are utterly inapplicable in modem times. Propo-
nents of the tax owe their lineage to revolutionary Americans and their
efforts to change a political system that was stacked against them. Oppo-
nents of the tax owe their lineage largely to Andrew Mellon, a Treasury
Secretary who embarked on a mission to destroy the estate tax. The Arti-
cle concludes in Part VI by refraining the federal estate tax as an efficient
and practical mechanism for raising revenue during times of crisis.
II. SOCIOLOGY AND CORE AMERICAN VALUES
A. Sociological Values
What characteristics define Americans? What is American culture?
Sociologist Robin M. Williams Jr. went in search of the answers to these
questions more than sixty years ago. In his seminal text, American Socie-
ty: A Sociological Interpretation, Williams identified a list of core Amer-
ican "values." In the sociological context, the term "value" refers to
"broad cultural principles that most people in a society consider desira-
ble."' 3 Values, as Williams explained, "are not the concrete goals of ac-
tion, but rather the criteria by which goals are chosen."l 4 As a result,
people sharing the same values might express those values differently, or
they might extrapolate them into different expressions of sociological
norms.
Looking at the work of other observers, Williams noted that several
traits could be seen in American society during all major historical peri-
ods. These traits included
associational activity, democracy, and belief and faith in it; belief in
the equality of all as a fact and as a right; freedom of the individual in
ideal and in fact; disregard of law-"direct action;" local govern-
ment; practicality; prosperity and general material well-being; puri-
tanism; emphasis on religion, and its great influence in national life;
uniformity and conformity.16
13. JON M. SHEPARD, SOCIOLOGY 67 (10th ed. 2010).
14. ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 440
(3ded. 1970).
15. See SHEPARD, supra note 13.
16. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 453.
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Williams saw these recurring themes and sought to reduce them to their
abstract forms-that is, their core essence as a "value."1 7 Williams ex-
plained that from a historical standpoint, our values developed "out of
religious tradition, frontier experience, ceaseless change, vast opportuni-
ty, and fluid social structure."' 8 The experiences of colonial and revolu-
tionary Americans set the course for development of an American culture
that is distinct and identifiable in terms of our collection of values. In his
quest to understand America, Williams eventually identified fifteen core
American values. Those values were later summarized as follows:
Table 1: Williams List of Central American Values 9
1. Achievement and success as the primary goal of every individual.
2. Activity and work, with little emphasis on leisure and a disdain for
laziness.
3. Moral orientation, including the absolute judgments of good and bad
or right and wrong.
4. Humanitarianism realized through philanthropy and aid to those in
need or crisis.
5. Efficiency and practicality, as demonstrated by seeking the fastest
and least costly means of achieving a goal.
6. Process and progress-a belief in future development and techno-
logical advancement.
7. Material comfort, sometimes articulated as "the American Dream."
8. Equality in its most abstract form-as an ideal rather than a policy.
9. Freedom expressed by emphasizing rights of the individual over the
state.
10. External conformity, meaning that one strives to be a "team player"
and does not "rock the boat."
11. Science and rationality as the primary vehicles by which to master
the environment for material benefits.
12. Nationalism and the belief that U.S. values and institutions are the
very best in the world.
13. Democracy based on personal freedom and equal opportunity.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 458-59 (citation omitted).
19. Karen A. Cerulo, Social Relations, Core Values, and the Polyphony of the American
Experience, 23 Soc. F. 351, 352 (2008).
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14. Individualism or the emphasis of personal rights and responsibilities.
15. Racism and group superiority or the edification of a white, Anglo-
Saxon, or northern European racial background.
The values Williams identified are both interrelated and contradic-
tory.20 For instance, the value of achievement/success is clearly related to
activity/work and material comfort. On the other hand, the values of in-
dividualism and freedom are, in some respects, contradictory to the val-
ues of external conformity and group superiority. Williams recognized
the potential for conflict, explaining that "persistent and widespread val-
ue-tension leads to political struggle, schismatic cleavages, or the segre-
gation of various groupings into a kind of mosaic society." 21 Later soci-
ologists expanded on this theme, finding that although these core values
are always present, they also shift in terms of importance over time and
among individuals.22 The expression of these values as societal norms
23and behaviors changes over time and from person to person.
B. Values and Political Attitudes
Our values play an important role in shaping public opinion regard-
ing political issues. 24 Not only do Americans use their core values to
decide where they stand on a specific issue, the manner in which public
figures frame those issues for us directly impacts our opinions.25 "Values
are within everyone's mental grasp, so they [can] be employed as a gen-
eral evaluative standard for generating and organizing reactions to politi-
cal issues."26 Politicians and pundits know this, and they use it to their
advantage. The "ability to frame issues . . . is undoubtedly one of the
most important 'tools' that political elites have at their disposal." 2 7 As a
result, "policy controversies confronting the public are, themselves, al-
most always phrased in terms of values." 2 8 When politicians disagree on
an issue, for whatever reason, they often frame the issue in terms of
"widely shared values."29
Politicians know that framing an issue in the light of a core Ameri-
can value affects how people react to that issue.30 Of course, in the realm
20. SHEPARD, supra note 13, at 68.
21. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 452.
22. See Cerulo, supra note 19, at 353.
23. See SHEPARD, supra note 13, at 68; Cerulo, supra note 19, at 353.
24. See William G. Jacoby, Value Choices and American Public Opinion, 50 AM. J. POL. Sl.
706, 716 (2006).
25. See id.
26. Id at 715-16.
27. Brewer, supra note 5, at 176 (alterations in original) (quoting William G. Jacoby, Issue
Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending, 44 AM. J. POL. SC. 750, 751 (2000)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
28. Jacoby, supra note 24.




of politics, we are usually presented with conflicting interpretations of
the same value or with competing values. The manner in which politi-
cians and other public figures frame the issues for us significantly im-
pacts our ultimate opinions. "[T]he specific language employed to con-
vey information about the opposing positions on an issue could well
prime individuals to think about certain values and ignore others while
working out their own responses."31
When we are presented with conflicting applications of the same
values, several things can happen. Consider the value of equality in the
context of the estate tax. Suppose opponents of the tax tell you that it
works against equality because it results in family farms and businesses
being taxed on the same income twice. Suppose proponents of the tax tell
you that it is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity for all Ameri-
cans by limiting inherited wealth. Sociology and public opinion research
suggests several possible reactions. You might just become confused and
fail to form an opinion on the issue. 3 2 You might feel some connection to
both arguments and end up feeling confused or ambivalent.33 You might
reject both arguments and conclude that equality is not relevant to the
issue of the estate tax.3 4
Similar responses can occur when an issue is framed in terms of
competing values. Suppose that opponents of the estate tax tell you that it
punishes hard work and success. Therefore, in order to protect those val-
ues, you should eliminate the tax. Meanwhile, proponents of the tax tell
you that it is necessary to ensure equality of opportunity and democracy
by limiting inherited wealth. Therefore, we must keep the tax in order to
protect those values. You could have some of the same responses you
had when presented with competing views of the same value. But, you
might find the argument framed in terms of success and work more com-
pelling than the argument framed in terms of equality and democracy.
Or, you might find the equality and democracy argument more compel-
ling than the success and work argument.
Research suggests that when presented with competing values, your
opinion may be shaped by which value you find more important.35 We
are all different, so it comes as no surprise that "there is extremely wide
variability in personal judgments about value importance."36 Most people
have "meaningful value hierarchies."3 7 In other words, most people
31. Jacoby, supra note 24.
32. See Brewer, supra note 5, at 177.
33. See id. at 178.
34. See id.





"seem to recognize that some values are more important than others, and
[such people] make the requisite choices between them."08
Your pop quiz illustrates the most popular competing frames con-
structed around the federal estate tax. As discussed in Part V below,
these frames have existed for a century or more. In that time, they have
proven to be deeply divisive. I argue that these frames are also outdated,
misguided, and utterly unsupported by the facts. Public figures on both
sides of the debate who perpetuate these frames are irresponsible. They
needlessly perpetuate an illogical debate. As a result, they impede the
possibility for us to make an important and useful safety net of revenue
available during a time of national financial crisis. If we are going to
move forward, we should reframe the issue in terms of efficiency and
practicality. 3 9
III. TAXING DEATH
The goal of the federal tax system, as a whole, is to raise revenue
for the federal government in a manner that is "fair." 4 0 To achieve "fair-
ness," we evaluate the tax system in light of concerns for vertical and
horizontal equity.41 Principles of horizontal equity require that "similarly
situated individuals ... be taxed similarly . . . ."42 Meanwhile, principles
of vertical equity provide that "individuals .. . be taxed according to their
ability to pay."A' To achieve both horizontal and vertical equity, most tax
scholars agree that the system should include multiple tax bases." For
example, in an effort to achieve "fairness," the current federal tax system
includes "income, property or wealth, and consumption" in the mix of
tax bases.45 Of course, this is a grossly generalized description. People
fundamentally disagree about what is "fair," which persons are "similarly
situated," and how we determine an individual's "ability to pay." 4 6
To understand the debate surrounding the federal estate tax, it is al-
so important to understand, in basic terms, what the federal estate tax is
and what other options are available. A good portion of the scholarly
debate over the federal estate tax examines the possibility of moving
3 8. Id.
39. See infra Part VI.
40. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns: Amending the
AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 818 (2004); Leo P. Martinez, "To Lay and Collect
Taxes ": The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 111, 115
(1999); Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy Theory: A Pragmatic Alterna-
tive, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1665,1669-71 (1986).
41. See STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 10 (2d ed. 2008).
42. Id.; see also David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 43, 43 (2006).
43. WILLBANKS, supra note 41; see also Shurtz, supra note 40, at 1671.
44. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41; Shurtz, supra note 40.
45. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 40; Shurtz, supra note 40, at 1671.
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from a federal estate tax to some other taxing regime. 47 These other re-
gimes could affect aspects of horizontal or vertical equity. The merits of
those arguments are beyond the scope of this Article.
Any time money or property changes hands we have an opportunity
to tax the transaction. In an overly simplistic sense, we have two options:
(1) tax the transferee on the receipt of property; or (2) tax the transferor
on the transfer of property. The federal tax system utilizes both options.
With respect to the gratuitous transfer of property occurring at death,
both options are feasible and likely constitutional.
A. Tax the Receipt ofProperty
Two methods of taxing the receipt of property from a decedent are
commonly proposed: (1) including inheritances within the income tax;
and (2) imposing an inheritance tax. The proposals are similar in many
respects.
1. Income Tax Approach
A relatively simple way to tax property transferred at death is to in-
clude inheritances within the scope of gross income. 4 8 The federal in-
come tax imposes a tax on the receipt of "income" by a taxpayer during
the calendar year.4 9 Every law student in an introductory income tax
course learns that income includes all "undeniable accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete domin-
ion."50 If not for a specific exception, this broad definition of income
would clearly include any inheritance received by a taxpayer. However,
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) specifically excludes inheritances and
gifts from the definition of gross income.5 1 A very simple way to tax
gratuitous transfers of property is to simply repeal that exclusion and
include the receipt of any inheritance within gross income of a taxpay-
er.52 This approach would likely meet constitutional requirements and
47. See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV.
469, 493-96 (2007); Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect From Heirs? The Case for a
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); Dodge, supra note 10, at 1178-80;
Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income-
Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551 passim
(2003); Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax With a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 997 passim (2009); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Con-
sumption Tax, 51 TAx L. REV. 529 passim (1996); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 350-56 (1994).
48. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8.
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
50. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 346 U.S. 426,431 (1955).
51. See 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
52. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8.
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would be fairly simple to administer.53 Additionally, taxing inheritances
as income could simplify the tax code.54
In all likelihood, the real problem with implementing this approach
is that gifts and inheritances have specifically been excluded from the
scope of the federal income tax for 100 years. Scholars and politicians
have many explanations and justifications for the exclusion.55 In reality,
it may just be a historical accident of sorts.56 For instance, some contend
that including inheritances in the federal income tax system might be
somehow "unfair." The federal income tax imposes a tax based on the
57value of property received by an individual taxpayer in any given year.
Income taxes are typically subject to a progressive rate scale, meaning
that larger accumulations of wealth in a given year are subject to pro-
gressively higher tax rates.58 If a taxpayer receives an exceptionally and
uncharacteristically large amount of income in one year, the IRC gener-
ally treats him no differently than a taxpayer receiving that amount of
income every year. In other words, this approach essentially treats an
inheritance as a windfall and would tax it no differently from any other
windfall-for example, lottery winnings. Some people perceive a distinc-
tion between property passing to you by death-often from a close fami-
ly member-and a winning lottery ticket or exceptionally large earnings.
As a result, some people believe the income tax approach is inherently
unfair because it would "tax[] unusually large receipts at progressively
higher rates."5 In other words, including inheritances within the scope of
the income tax would run afoul of principles of horizontal equity. A per-
son receiving an inheritance is, perhaps, not similarly situated to other
taxpayers with comparable amounts of income. Moreover, taxing inher-
itances as income could violate principles of vertical equity where the
property is illiquid or not fungible. In that case, the taxpayer would not
have the same ability to pay as a taxpayer holding cash.o On the other
hand, some commentators specifically endorse including inheritances
within the scope of gross income as a way to regulate inherited wealth.6
As one advocate of this approach explains, "[B]y imposing the tax direct-
ly on those who receive the money, Congress could have a more honest
discussion regarding the appropriate taxation of inherited wealth."62
53. See id. at 8-9.
54. See Dodge, supra note 10, at 1191.
55. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1992).
56. See id.
57. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
58. See id.
59. wILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 9.
60. See Sergio Pareja, Taxation Without Liquidation: Rethinking "Ability to Pay," 2008 WiS.
L. REV. 841, 858-59 (proposing a wealth transfer system that treats liquid and illiquid assets differ-
ently in light of ability-to-pay concerns).




2. Inheritance Tax Approach
A second way to tax the gratuitous receipt of property at death is the
inheritance tax.6 3 Like an income tax, an inheritance tax taxes the receipt
of property by a particular beneficiary.64 However, inheritance taxes,
which are fairly common at the state and local tax level, typically operate
independently of the income tax system. Inheritance taxes, therefore,
are not subject to the same rate scales as income taxes. That result could
be achieved within the income tax setting by simply imposing a different
66rate of tax on inheritances, much as we do for long-term capital gains.
However, every existing inheritance tax ties the rate of tax imposed to
the familial relationship between the decedent and the recipient.6 1 Specif-
ically, receipts from close relatives are subject to lower rates of tax than
68receipts from distant relatives or non-relatives. For that reason, the pol-
icy implications are somewhat distinct from the implications of taxing an
inheritance as income.
The familial relationship-based rate structure essentially requires the
government to enact legislation defining a taxpayer's family and effec-
tively ranking degrees of familial relations, a particularly problematic
prospect given the changing views of family and society. Furthermore,
familial relationship-based rate structures can create horizontal and verti-
cal inequity. By treating taxpayers differently based on government no-
tions of family, an inheritance tax may ignore economic reality.6 9 The
inheritance tax presupposes that close relatives are not similarly situated
to other heirs. Furthermore, by favoring transfers to close relatives, an
inheritance tax wholly ignores their ability to pay. Finally, this approach
seems to actually encourage accumulating wealth within the family ra-
ther than spreading the wealth around.
B. Tax the Transfer of Property
The modem estate tax imposes a tax on the transferor of property,
the decedent, and his estate.70 Sometimes described as "an excise tax on
the privilege of transferring property at death," 7 1 the estate tax looks at
63. By extension, this could include an accessions tax.
64. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 8.
65. See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not to Die in 2012, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 1:11PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/201 11 2/22/where-not-to-die-in-2012 (providing an
interactive map of state-level inheritance and estate taxes).
66. See 26 U.S.C. § I(h) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
67. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 78 (2009) ("It is true that every U.S. state and
nineteen of the twenty-three countries with an inheritance tax impose higher taxes on gifts and
bequests received from nonrelatives. Often, the tax rate rises or the exempt amount falls as the
relationship to the donor becomes more attenuated.").
68. Id.
69. See Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting Meanings of
Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 1, 5-6 (2006).
70. See 26 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 20.2002-1 (1960).
71. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 7.
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the value of all of the property a decedent owned at the time of his death
and applies a tax directly on the gratuitous transfer of that property.72
Unlike the income tax and the inheritance tax approaches, the estate tax
looks at the property in the hands of the decedent rather than the property
received by any particular beneficiary. Thus, the decedent's estate, not
the beneficiary is primarily liable for the payment of the tax.74 The cur-
rent federal system employs an estate tax.75 However, the current system
does not apply an estate tax in the strict sense. For instance, like an inher-
itance tax, transfers to certain beneficiaries-namely charities and sur-
viving spouses-are treated favorably.76 In fact, these transfers are essen-
tially exempt from the estate tax.77 Furthermore, decedents receive a
credit against the tax.78 Under the current system, the credit is so large
the decedent will not face any estate tax until the amount of property he
transfers to someone other than a charity or his surviving spouse exceeds
$5 million.79 As a result, very few estates are subject to the tax, and it
does not raise a significant amount of revenue.80 However, keeping the
current federal estate tax system in place, this could easily be changed by
adjusting the various credits and deductions available.
IV. TAX POLICY AND THE NATURE OF POLICY DEBATES
Congress uses tax laws in order to promote a variety of social and
political policies. The heart of most current tax debates stems from the
non-revenue purposes of the tax laws, namely (1) the redistribution of
wealth, and (2) the regulation of private sector activity.8 ' Although
Americans disagree about the amount of revenue that should be raised,
the simple notion of imposing a variety of taxes to raise revenue is not
particularly controversial. Using the federal tax system to achieve some
social-engineering function, however, is a different story,82 and that is the
source of a good deal of policy debate. Because the federal tax system is
one of the federal government's most powerful tools, regulatory and re-
distributive policies are absolutely pervasive in the federal tax system.
A. Typical Policy Debate: Home-Mortgage Interest Deduction
To understand the nature of a tax policy debate from a sociological
perspective, let's begin with a familiar example: the income tax deduc-
72. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
73. See id.
74. See 26 U.S.C. § 2002.
75. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001.
76. See 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (charitable deduction); 26 U.S.C. § 2056
(2006) (marital deduction).
77. See sources cited supra note 76.
78. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493,
1493 (2000).
81. Avi-Yonah, supra note I1.
82. See id.
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tion allowed for home-mortgage interest. Few people seriously debate
the fundamental legitimacy of the federal income tax as a means for rais-
ing government revenue. Rather, the major arguments surround the so-
cial engineering aspects of the tax. Congress often expresses a redistribu-
tive or regulatory goal in the form of a deduction or credit, which
amounts to a government expenditure promoting the activity.
The home-mortgage interest tax deduction is an example most
Americans will understand and is a good illustration of this idea. The
IRC allows individual taxpayers to deduct the interest paid on their home
mortgage from their gross income. As a deduction, this aspect of the
federal income tax does not raise revenue. Rather, its main goals relate to
taxation's other two purposes: redistribution and regulation. The deduc-
tion is redistributive because it amounts to a governmental expenditure
84aimed at assisting taxpayers in acquiring property. This would help
taxpayers literally buy in to the American dream of home ownership.
The deduction is regulatory because it supposedly "steer[s] private sector
activity in the directions desired by government[]."8 In theory, home
ownership results in many societal economic benefits; therefore, our
government seeks to incentivize ownership through this deduction.87
After the housing market collapse, some commentators questioned
the wisdom of this incredibly popular deduction. 8 Opponents of the de-
duction argue that it incentivized overinvestment in housing, which con-
tributed to the collapse in the housing market. 89 Moreover, the benefits of
the deduction increase with the taxpayer's income and the size of his
mortgage, prompting opponents to characterize it as "the most inequita-
ble and inefficient provision in the Internal Revenue Code." 90 Both sides
of this argument have merit.91 But, repeal is very unlikely: this deduction
is incredibly popular. Naturally, many Americans support the deductions
for which they are eligible. But it is more than that. Knowing what we do
about issue framing, that is unsurprising. Proponents framed their argu-
ment in terms of promoting the "American dream," and this dream drew
on a number of core values. The opposition, in contrast, primarily frames
83. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (2006).
84. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1352-53 (2000).
85. See Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and
Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 51-52 (2009); see also Mann, supra note 84, at 1348-50; Ben
Steverman, A Taxing Debate: The Mortgage-Interest Deduction, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2011,
9:13AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-17/a-taxing-debate-the-mortgage-interest-
deduction.html.
86. Avi-Yonah, supra note 11.
87. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 84, at 1354 (discussing various arguments that homeowner-
ship improves society and the economy).
88. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 85, at 33; Steverman, supra note 85.
89. See, e.g., Hardaway, supra note 85, at 46; Steverman, supra note 85.
90. Steverman, supra note 85 (quoting Dennis J. Ventry Jr., a tax law specialist from the
University of California Davis School of Law); see also Hardaway, supra note 85, at 50-51.
91. See Mann, supra note 84, at 1353.
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its argument in terms of practicality and efficiency-values which may
rank lower in many Americans' value hierarchies. And, perhaps more
importantly, the opposition has not attained a significant level of media
saturation compared to proponents. As a result, many Americans are
likely unfamiliar with the opposition's frame.92
B. Atypical Policy Debate: The Federal Estate Tax
The federal estate tax, and by extension the federal gift tax and gen-
eration-skipping transfer tax, is an example of this type of debate taken
to the extreme. Unlike other tax policy debates, the extreme positions are
expressed not only by academics, but also by widely recognized public
figures, as illustrated by your pop quiz. And their positions are truly ex-
treme. Given what we know about sociology, issue framing, and public
opinion, their positions are problematic and irresponsible. Rather than
challenging a single aspect of the overall estate tax system, like a specific
credit or deduction, opponents advocate eliminating the tax in its entire-
ty.9 3 And some proponents go so far as to advocate using it to entirely
eliminate inherited wealth. 94 Other proponents would keep the tax re-
gardless of actual revenue need.
For that reason, this debate is inherently different from other tax
policy debates. The debate concerning the redistributive and regulatory
policies of the home-mortgage interest deduction, for instance, rarely
results in calls for repeal of the federal income tax in its entirety. That
debate, and similar debates, focuses on the legitimacy of the policy ad-
vanced and the effectiveness of the IRC in promoting the policy. The
estate tax debate, however, is full of extremists and particularly plagued
by misleading rhetoric framed in terms of core American values. Oppo-
nents are willing to fully abandon a constitutional source of federal reve-
nue, during a time when that revenue is badly needed, because of the
social engineering goals of the tax. Some proponents support the social
aspects of the tax so passionately that they would keep the tax even dur-
ing times of government surplus. And these arguments are particularly
infuriating when we consider that in its century-long existence, the mod-
ern estate tax has never actually accomplished its purported goal of regu-
lating inherited wealth.
Your pop quiz illustrates the current debate and the fundamental fal-
lacies it perpetuates. Both sides frame the debate in terms of fundamental
American values. The values they point to are contradictory. To propo-
92. See Brewer, supra note 5.
93. See, e.g., Does the Death Tax Have a Date with the Grim Reaper?, LIFEHEALTHPRO
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.1ifehealthpro.com/2012/03/01/does-the-death-tax-have-a-date-with-the-
gnm-reape.
94. See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 72-73 (1990).
95. See DANIEL MILLER, JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., THE ECONOMICS OF THE
ESTATE TAx 5-6 (1999).
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nents, the estate tax ensures the core American values of democracy and
equality of opportunity by taking wealth out of the hands of the richest
Americans and returning it back into society. 9 6 The redistribution fur-
thers democracy by ensuring equality of opportunity." It ensures that no
one starts life on better footing simply by winning the "parent lottery."
These are emotionally powerful arguments supported by few facts. For
instance, consider Warren Buffett's argument: "Dynastic wealth, the
enemy of a meritocracy, is on the rise. Equality of opportunity has been
on the decline.. . . A progressive and meaningful estate tax is needed to
curb the movement of a democracy toward plutocracy., 98 Recent reports
do seem to support a part of Buffett's argument-that is, that America's
wealth is concentrated in the hands of relatively few Americans.9 9 Fur-
thermore, excessive concentrations of wealth do result in very real social
harms and tend to undermine our values of equality and democracy. 00
However, very little, if any, evidence indicates this situation directly
results from inherited wealth.io' Although Buffett and others correctly
identify a potential problem, little evidence supports the argument that
the estate tax is an appropriate or even effective remedy to that prob-
lem. 102 Despite its existence for nearly 100 years, "[n]o one knows
whether the estate tax minimizes concentrations of wealth." 03 In truth,
the modern problem of wealth inequalities more likely stems from prob-
lems with our economic system, not our political system.'0
The quotation from Bill Gates Sr. takes a slightly different approach
by arguing that those Americans who financially benefit the most during
life owe a debt to this country. o Gates is appealing, in part, to our hu-
manitarian values. He is also appealing to our equality values. To Gates
and other proponents, our core American values enabled their families to
achieve such great success, and as a result, those who benefit the most
from American society owe society a debt for that success. In Gates's
words: "Society has a just claim on our fortunes and that claim goes by
the name estate tax."' 06 However, that is merely political rhetoric.'o7 Alt-
hough wealthy Americans might have some moral obligation to give
96. See Drawbaugh, supra note 1.
97. See id
98. Id. (quoting Warren Buffett).
99. See Income Distribution: Poor, Rich, and Richest, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2011,
12:53PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/25/income-distribution-in
2008 n 1030201.html.
100. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 13.
101. See id.
102. See id at 14.
103. Id.
104. See e.g., James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 831-
33 (2001).
105. See Gates, supra note 4.
106. Id.
107. Cf William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Rhetoric and Economics in the Estate Tax Debate,
54 NAT'L TAx J. 613,623-24 (2001).
190 [Vol. 90: 1
DEATH TAX DEBATE
back to society, this does not necessarily mean Americans should have a
legal obligation to do so. Moreover, it is unclear whether the estate tax,
or any tax for that matter, is an appropriate, effective, or efficient mecha-
nism for compelling compliance with that obligation. In fact, history
* 108indicates the contrary is true.
Arguments made by opponents of the tax are equally flawed. To
opponents, the estate tax is antithetical to many of our core American
values, including achievement/success, activity/work, and material com-
fort. The estate tax punishes achievement and success by taxing income
that has already been taxed once during life. Similarly, the estate tax pre-
vents activity and work by harming family farms and businesses. Again,
these are emotionally powerful arguments. But they are also arguments
unsupported by the facts. Both Mitt Romney and George W. Bush make
the double-taxation argument in your pop quiz. That argument is flawed
in some respects and an oversimplification in others. The federal tax sys-
tem taxes taxpayers, not assets, and "[i]t is a fact that money used to
make bequests ... may be taxed more than once." 09 In truth, many as-
sets in our economy are subject to multiple layers of tax, of which the
estate tax is only one." 0 Nothing is inherently unfair about that outcome.
On the flip side, many assets taxed at death were never taxed by the in-
come tax.'' And, if they were taxed, they were likely taxed at preferen-
tial capital gains rates.112
The quote from former President Bush reflects the other prominent
argument made by opponents: the estate tax "hurt[s] the source of most
new jobs in this country-America's small business and farms."" 3 The
family-farm-and-small-business argument invokes another aspect of the
American dream: work and activity should be rewarded, not punished.
We should not impose burdens on those job creators. By framing the
issue this way, opponents make an incredibly powerful argument, partic-
ularly in a struggling economy when people tend to place a high value on
their own immediate job security. At its core, this argument supposedly
reflects the concern that some business owners may lack the cash liquidi-
ty at death to pay the estate tax without having to sell an interest in their
business.114 As a result, opponents contend, hard work is punished, busi-
nesses are destroyed, and jobs are lost. But the facts do not support this
argument."' Quite simply, the contention that the estate tax destroys
108. See infra Part V.
109. Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 624.
110. Id. at 624-25.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Trull, supra note 3 (quoting George W. Bush).
114. WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 17.
115. See id. at 17-18; see also Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 618; Robert Frank, Does the
Estate Tax Hurt Farmers and Family Businesses?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2010, 11:51AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2010/12/16/does-the-estate-tax-hurt-farmers-and-family-businesses/.
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family farms and small businesses is a myth.' 16 Moreover, the IRC itself
provides many accommodations aimed at alleviating harsh results of this
largely illusory problem.1 17
V. VIEWING THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAx
THROUGH A SOCIOLOGY LENS
The issue framing in the current federal estate tax debate is toxic
and irresponsible. In a time of national exigency, when revenue is des-
perately needed, the federal estate tax has the potential to provide a safe-
ty net. History shows us that potential. But history also shows us where
we went wrong. Attaching a social policy to the tax in its entirety, rather
than one credit or deduction, rendered that safety net unusable. The so-
cial policy placed fundamental and deeply entrenched American values
in irreconcilable conflict with each other. Moreover, history shows us
that the manner in which the debate is presently framed no longer makes
sense, if it ever did. Proponents frame the issue in terms that made sense
during colonial and revolutionary times. The economic landscape of our
country has obviously changed dramatically since those days. As a result,
this argument is no longer applicable. Opponents frame the issue in the
manner outlined by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon in the 1920s. His
positions were largely motivated by a single unique case, the Estate of
Frick. His positions were not really supported by the facts when he made
them nearly 100 years ago. They remain equally unsupportable today.
Yet, because both sides framed the issue so powerfully in terms of core
American values, the debate continued along the same lines relatively
unaltered. Enough is enough. The time has come to reframe the issue in
terms that are actually supported by facts.
A. Revolutionary Core American Values and Politics
Many of our core American values developed as a result of the
shared experiences of colonial and revolutionary Americans, and that is
particularly true of the values commonly seen in the federal estate tax
debate. Williams explained that from a historical standpoint, our values
developed "out of religious tradition, frontier experience, ceaseless
change, vast opportunity, and fluid social structure."' 18 For instance, ac-
tivity and work were "required for group survival along the moving fron-
tier from the first settlements until the continent had been won.""'9 The
Protestant religious tradition supported this value, viewing successful
work and activity as a "sign of grace." 20 Furthermore, the bulk of Amer-
ica's early population originated from the working classes in Europe and
116. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 17-18; see also David Cay Johnston, Talk of Lost
Fanns Reflects Muddle ofEstate Tax Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,2001, at Al.
117. wlLLBANKS, supra note 41, at 18.
118. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 458-59 (citation omitted).




Britain.'12 These same factors resulted in the emergence of equality of
opportunity as a core value. Most colonists, being from middle- and low-
er-class origins, expressly rejected the class distinctions of Britain and
Europe.122 As Williams observed, "Mass accessibility to abundant re-
sources made it seem possible for 'anyone to become a king on his own'
and thus helped to dissolve old hierarchies and social forms through
movement, acquisition, and independence."' 23 The value of equality of
opportunity was further made a part of our culture through "the deeply
individualistic tendencies in Protestantism." 24
These same factors shaped early American views on economics and
politics. Revolutionary leaders were deeply concerned about the appro-
priate distribution of wealth and wanted to ensure equitable, but not nec-
essarily equal, distribution.125 To these leaders, appropriate wealth distri-
bution could only be attained through appropriate political structures.
Given the revolutionaries' firsthand experience with the European and
British class structures and monarchies, their concerns and beliefs were
understandable. Political institutions had enabled and maintained these
class distinctions. The decision to form a republic government was, in
many ways, truly revolutionary. Americans understood that "if property
were concentrated in the hands of a few in a republic, those few would
use their wealth to control other citizens, seize political power, and warp
the republic into an oligarchy." 26 In the view of these early Americans,
the political systems of Europe and Britain were the source of inequity.127
The solution, in their minds, rested on the rejection of those political
institutions. Specifically, they had to reject the political institutions that
had enabled and maintained the aristocracy.
To the revolutionaries, appropriate wealth distribution depended on
adopting a political system that utilized the labor theory of property, as
epitomized by John Locke. Under this theory, "only an individual's labor
created property, and therefore the individual had sole right to possession
and disposition of that property." 2 8 "[P]roperty was the just reward of
those who toiled" under this view.129 Wealth achieved in a manner con-
sistent with the American values of work and activity was acceptable and






126. James L. Huston, The American Revolutionaries, the Political Economy of Aristocracy,
and the American Concept of the Distribution of Wealth, 1765-1900, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 1079, 1080
(1993).
127. Id. at 1103-04.
128. Id. at 1081.
129. Id.
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Britain, was the enemy of an appropriate distribution of wealth. 3 0 Given
that mindset, the evolution of American inheritance laws is unsurprising.
B. Early American Inheritance Law and Policy
The origins of the federal estate tax, and the ensuing debate, are tied
to the evolution of American inheritance laws. Early Americans relied
heavily on English law in designing their own legal systems. The case of
inheritance laws, however, was complicated by America's newly formed
values, which were distinct from those of Britain.' 3' It was also compli-
cated by America's desire to eradicate the political institutions that had
enabled the aristocracy. From a philosophical standpoint, two views of
inheritance were popular at the time. America could view the right to
transfer property at death as a natural right or as a civil right, philoso-
phies advocated by John Locke and William Blackstone, respectively.' 3 2
Both men, of course, were influential in shaping American law.
John Locke believed that men possessed certain inalienable, natural
rights, including life, liberty, and property.133 By extension, Locke con-
tended that inheritance was similarly a natural right belonging to chil-
dren.' 3 4 This right, as Locke explained, went far beyond merely ensuring
a decedent's children did not end up destitute.
For children being by the course of nature born weak and unable to
provide for themselves, they have by the appointment of God him-
self, who hath thus ordered the course of nature, a right to be nour-
ished and maintained by their parents; nay, a right not only to a bare
subsistence, but to the conveniences and comforts of life as far as the
conditions of their parents can afford it.135
As a natural right, the right to inheritance was inalienable and could not
be altered by law.
On the other hand, Blackstone took the position that inheritance was
merely a civil right.
The right of inheritance, or descent to the children and relations of
the deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right
of devising by testament. We are apt to conceive at first view that it
has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what we find
established by long and inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise and
effectual, but clearly a political, establishment; since the permanent
130. See id.
131. See Repetti, supra note 104, at 831.
132. Id. at 828-29.
133. Robert R. Baugh, American Values: The Ties that Bind, 112 EDUC. 217, 221 (2001).




right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural, but
merely a civil, right.136
Blackstone acknowledged that it was customary in many countries to
leave property to your immediate family at your death.137 However, in
Blackstone's view, the fact that a decedent's family and children tended
to be the recipients of his property did not mean that they were entitled to
it as a matter of natural law.
America, ostensibly at least, adopted Blackstone's view of inher-
itance as a civil right.'3 8 Acceptance of that view had important conse-
quences. As a civil right, inheritance was not necessarily a right that
would later be protected by the Constitution.139 As a civil, rather than a
natural, right, government possessed a theoretically unlimited ability to
regulate inheritances.140 As one observer noted:
A right which exists solely by the creative act of the law can, of
course, be taken away by law, or it can be limited or modified in any
way which seems desirable. If the government should take the half or
whole of every inheritance by its taxing power, no natural right
would be violated.141
However, Americans probably never fully bought in to Blackstone's
approach followed to its natural conclusion-that is, being able to trans-
fer property at death is merely a privilege that government grants and that
government can take away. That view would ultimately prove incon-
sistent with American values.
To colonial and revolutionary Americans, however, the civil-rights-
versus-natural-rights debate was probably less important than the actual
enactment of positive law. Although Americans accepted Blackstone's
underlying theory of inheritance, they soon rejected the English law of
inheritance as memorialized by Blackstone.142 English inheritance law in
the time of Blackstone still maintained many aspects of its own compli-
cated feudal past.143 Eighteenth-century English inheritance law provided
for the disposition of a decedent's property either pursuant to a will or, in
the absence of a will, by the law of intestacy. Progressive in some re-
spects, feudal in others, "[t]he law controlling both testamentary and
136. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 (photo. reprint
2006) (1766).
137. See id. at l1-12.
138. See Ascher, supra note 94, at 77-78.
139. See id. at 84.
140. See id at 78.
141. The Federal Inheritance Tax, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 19, 1909, at 10.
142. See Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolu-
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intestate succession was, to modem eyes, a frightfully complicated me-
lange of half-modernized medievalisms."l 4 5
Englishmen enjoyed fairly expansive freedom to dispose of proper-
ty by will in whatever manner they deemed fit.146 This was, in some re-
spects, a departure from England's feudal past. However, some feudal
practices remained. For instance, the doctrine of entail, a remnant of feu-
dal England, allowed the testator to prevent certain beneficiaries from
alienating the real property bequeathed to them, thus allowing the testa-
tor to continue controlling property from the grave.147 The intestate
scheme of property distribution showed even more aspects of feudal ide-
ology. Primogeniture was the default intestacy scheme.14 8 If a decedent
died intestate, his eldest son inherited his real estate to the exclusion of
other children.14 9 The decedent's personal property was distributed
among his children and his surviving spouse.150
Both primogeniture and entail were critical to establishing and
maintaining a landed aristocracy in England. To revolutionary Ameri-
cans, these practices "were among the most important props of aristocrat-
ic society and generators of inequality."'' Initially, these practices con-
tinued in Colonial America.152 By the end of the Revolution, however,
virtually all of the colonies expressly rejected primogeniture and en-
tail.' At the time, Americans saw the abolition of primogeniture and
entail "as one of the revolution's greatest achievements and guarantors of
republican equality."' 54 Revolutionary Americans knew from their own
British and European experiences that large inheritances prohibited elec-
tive representative government.'55 Money is power and large accumula-
tions of money via inheritance prevented men from having equal oppor-
tunity to participate in government.156 Thus, Revolutionary Americans
expressly rejected practices such as primogeniture and entail, which
served mainly to preserve inherited wealth. Moreover, these English
practices had "furnished the principle that defined the succession to the
Crown and the peerage."' 57 These were precisely the institutions Ameri-
cans sought to eradicate.






151. Huston, supra note 126, at 1090.
152. Katz, supra note 142, at 10-11.
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Looking to break with English tradition and embracing the new
"American" values, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson were two of the
most vocal opponents of inherited wealth at the time.158 Both men framed
the issue in terms of core American values. These frames remain rela-
tively unaltered in the modern federal estate tax debate-a debate for
which they are no longer well suited. Thomas Jefferson argued that in-
herited wealth led to an "artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and
birth, without either talent or virtue."' 59 Paine similarly viewed inher-
itance as a possible threat to representative government.
To the evil of monarchy we have added that of hereditary succession;
and as the first is a degradation and lessening of ourselves, so the
second, claimed as a matter of right, is an insult and an imposition on
posterity. For all men being originally equals, no one by birth could
have a right to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all
others for ever, and through himself might deserve some decent de-
gree of honors of his contemporaries, yet his descendants might be
far too unworthy to inherit them. 160
Both Paine and Jefferson presented various ideas for eliminating
and preventing the perceived injustices perpetuated by English inher-
itance practices.16' They advocated for abolishing entail and primogeni-
ture.16 2 They proposed more egalitarian schemes of intestacy that divided
property among all children, or at least all male children, equally.163
These propositions found their way into positive law. But Paine and Jef-
ferson went further. Viewing inheritance as a merely civil right, both
men suggested that government could limit the ability of any man to in-
herit a vast fortune.M For instance, Paine proposed a progressive inher-
itance tax that would limit the amount of wealth that could be inherited
by any individual.165 Under Paine's proposal, the marginal tax rates rose
to 100% on the largest estates, thereby prohibiting the inheritance of
wealth beyond a certain predetermined point.'6 6 Paine and Jefferson
painted their proposals as breaking from the English traditions of monar-
chy and aristocracy. Rather, their proposals promoted freedom and
equality of opportunity. It is easy to see why these arguments were fairly
well received. They appealed to the American values most prevalent at
the time.
158. See Repetti, supra note 104, at 830-31.
159. Alica Lerud, Note, Looking to the Past in Planning for the Future: Does the Modern
Estate Tax Fit Within the Ideals of the Founding Fathers?, 6 NEv. L.L 516, 538 (2005).
160. Id.
161. See id.; see also Katz, supra note 142, at 12-13.
162. See Lerud, supra note 159.
163. Id. at 538-39.
164. See id.




C. Early Federal Death Taxes
Early federal estate and inheritance taxes had little, if anything, to
do with promoting any social policies related to inherited wealth. These
taxes were enacted with the rather modest goal of generating needed
revenue during times of war or crisis.1 67 The American experience with
taxing property transfers taking place at death officially began with the
Stamp Act of July 6, 1797.168 Despite its stated policy of neutrality, the
United States was increasingly impacted by the unrest in Europe stem-
ming from the French Revolution, which had begun some years earli-
er.16 9 The various international tensions prompted Congress to improve
and expand the American naval forces. 170 To raise the necessary revenue
for this naval development, Congress enacted a system of stamp duties,
which included certain stamp duties relating to death and probate.17 1
Specifically, the 1797 Stamp Act required the purchase and use of feder-
al stamps in connection with various estate-related legal documents such
as inventories, receipts for legacies, probates of wills, and letters of ad-
ministration.172 Rates were fairly modest, and shares of the estate passing
to surviving wives, children, or grandchildren were exempt.17 3 Eventual-
ly, the international tensions abated and with them the need for additional
revenue. Congress repealed the 1797 Stamp Act in 1802.174
Americans did not see this sort of federal tax again until the Civil
War, some sixty years later. Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1862 in
order to raise the additional funds necessitated by the Civil War.17 5 The
Revenue Act of 1862 included a federal stamp tax on the probate of wills
and letters of administration, much like the prior Stamp Act.17 6 However,
the new tax imposed an inheritance tax on the receipt of personal proper-
ty rather than a stamp tax.177 Like most inheritance taxes, the 1862 tax
consisted of graduated rates depending on the closeness in the familial
relationship between the decedent and the recipient of the property.7
Once again, the rates were fairly modest.17 9 Pursuant to the Revenue Act
167. See Lerud, supra note 159, at 517.
168. See JOHN R. LUCKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE, GIFT,
AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TAXES 2 (2005); Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate
Tax, 11 TAx L. REV. 223, 225 (1956).
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of 1864, Congress increased the inheritance tax rates and included the
transfer of real property within the scope of the inheritance tax.'s After
the war, Congress quickly repealed these taxes.' 8'
Along with the Spanish-American War came the re-emergence of
federal taxes on transfers of property at death. These taxes were still not
aimed at preventing inherited wealth. Congress passed the War Revenue
Act of 1898, again with the simple goal of financing a war.' 8 2 The 1898
Act included a tax on the transfer of personal property at death."s As
with prior incarnations of federal transfer taxes, the 1898 tax exempted
transfers to surviving spouses.184 Rates depended on both the size of the
estate and the degree of familial relationship between the decedent and
the beneficiary, resulting in a tax with characteristics of both an inher-
itance tax and an estate tax.'85 Once again, Congress repealed the tax
shortly after the end of the war.'86
These first few incarnations of federal inheritance taxes were pri-
marily, if not exclusively, motivated by the need for revenue. 87 Alt-
hough the election to impose an inheritance tax rather than an estate tax
could be indicative of some underlying social policy, it does not appear
that much thought was given to any social policy at the time.' Rather,
the taxes quite simply existed to raise revenue in a manner that would not
place any undue hardship on taxpayers. The taxes were relatively uncon-
troversial, and most people assumed that death taxes would only be used
in times of exigency.189
D. Rise of the Manufacturing Aristocracy and an Era of Change
By the late 1800s, America's economic landscape had changed sig-
nificantly.' 90 By that point, achievement and success-particularly secu-
lar occupational achievement and success-were thoroughly entrenched
in the American value system.191 For the first time, however, Americans
faced a conflict between those values and the equally fundamental value
of equality of opportunity.19 2 Rejecting the economic and social restraints
faced in Britain and Europe "could only lead under the historical circum-
stances to the emergence of what [Tocqueville] called a manufacturing
180. Under the 1864 Act, rates ranged from 1% to 6%. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 120.
183. Lerud, supra note 159, at 523.
184. Id. at 524.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 525.
187. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 226.
188. Id.
189. See id.; see also LUCKEY, supra note 168, at 3.
190. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 226.
191. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 454.
192. Id. at 473.
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aristocracy."l 9 3 The era of the robber barons laid the groundwork for a
major, unavoidable, and continuing tension between American values.
The Industrial Revolution and the transforming economy changed
the concentration of wealth in America in measurable ways by the late
nineteenth century. Americans saw vast amounts of wealth become con-
centrated in the hands of a few industrialists.194 This "manufacturing
aristocracy" presented a dilemma. On the one hand, Americans embraced
the "rags to riches" stories embodied by these elite few.' 95 As Williams
observed, "The 'success story' and the respect accorded to the self-made
man are distinctly American, if anything is."1 96 Therefore, the members
of this manufacturing aristocracy embodied the upward mobility that was
part of the promised American dream.197 1Through hard work, anyone
could achieve great success.
On the other hand, the growing wealth inequities revived some of
the concerns expressed by Jefferson and Paine regarding inherited
wealth. Many Americans continued to believe that inherited wealth ran
afoul of the principle of equality of opportunity because it gave some
individuals a decided advantage due simply to parentage.'9 8 The econom-
ics seemed to support the concern that the dangers of inherited wealth
would be soon realized. By the late 1800s, wealth inequality reached a
high point. In the period between 1774 and 1900, the concentration of the
country's total wealth in the hands of the richest 1% of Americans rose
dramatically: from 15% in 1774; to 29% in 1860; to 50% by 1900.'99
Thus, by 1900, Americans saw great disparities between the richest
Americans and the poorest-and even between the richest Americans
and everyone else.
Americans were conflicted. To many, the promise of America and
capitalism was the potential for upward mobility. The industry barons of
the era embodied this dream. But whether the descendants of these bar-
ons should inherit these vast fortunes was another story. The Jefferson
and Paine position re-emerged, this time taking aim at the American
manufacturing aristocrats. Jefferson and Paine argued against the evils of
a political system that had enabled European and British aristocrats to
maintain their power. That political system prevented non-aristocrats
from participating in the government, economy, and society. Thus, the
Jefferson-Paine argument seemed well founded at the time of the Revo-
193. Id. at 474.
194. J. Bradford DeLong, A History of Bequests in the United States, in DEATH AND DOLLARS:
THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN AMERICA 33, 35 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sunddn eds.,
Brookings Institution Press 2003).
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lution. To avoid exclusively aristocratic participation, America had to
design a political system that would not enable an aristocracy. By the
1900s, Americans saw a new "aristocracy" formed on their own soil, and
they used the same revolutionary-era arguments to advocate political
changes aimed at suppressing it. But times had changed.
The wealth disparity seen during the turn of the century had little, if
anything, to do with inherited wealth. The rather extreme wealth dispari-
ties resulted from capitalism, industry, and the changing economic land-
scape of America. There is scant data to support the assertion that these
numbers resulted from inherited wealth. 2 00 Rather, this era was "witness
to an unprecedented number of mergers in the manufacturing sector of
the economy, fueled by the development of a new form of corporate
ownership, the holding company." 2 0' These economic changes "resulted
in the concentration of wealth in a relatively small number of powerful
companies and ... the businessmen who headed them." 2 02 An estate tax
would not likely do anything to remedy this wealth-disparity problem. 203
Yet, progressives argued that an estate tax was essential to remedy the
* . 204inequity. Proponents of the tax framed the issue in terms of core
American values, and the public found that framing irresistible.
One of the prominent voices in the growing movement to prevent
inherited wealth was Andrew Carnegie. In his influential essay, Wealth,
Carnegie epitomized the country's uncomfortable position with its new
economic landscape.205 On the one hand, Carnegie championed industry
and wealth accumulation.
The price which society pays for the law of competition, like the
price it pays for cheap comforts and luxuries, is also great; but the
advantages of this law are also greater still, for it is to this law that
we owe our wonderful material development, which brings improved
conditions in its train. . . .We accept and welcome, therefore, as con-
ditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of
environment, the concentration of business, industrial and commer-
cial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these,
as being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of
the race.206
To Carnegie and others, lifetime wealth accumulation was their just
reward for great talent: "That this talent for organization and manage-
ment is rare among men is proved by the fact that it invariably secures
for its possessor enormous rewards, no matter where or under what laws
200. See WILLBANKS, supra note 41, at 13.
201. Jacobson et al., supra note 179, at 120.
202. Id.
203. See infra Part VI.
204. Jacobson et al., supra note 179, at 120.
205. Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653, 653 (1889).
206. Id. at 655.
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or conditions."207 On the other hand, with this great wealth and power,
came a duty to dispose of that wealth in a manner that benefitted society
as a whole. Those who benefitted most from living in America, like Car-
negie, owed the country the largest debt. To Carnegie, that did not mean
leaving it to heirs who had done nothing to earn it.2 08 His sentiments ech-
oed those of Paine and Jefferson. Simply allowing a child to inherit the
wealth would cause irreparable harm to society.
Why should men leave great fortunes to their children? If this is done
from affection, is it not misguided affection? Observation teaches
that, generally speaking, it is not well for the children that they
should be so burdened. Neither is it well for the state. Beyond provid-
ing for the wife and daughters moderate sources of income, and very
moderate allowances indeed, if any, for the sons, men may well hesi-
tate, for it is no longer questionable that great sums bequeathed of-
tener work more for the injury than for the good of the recipients.
Wise men will soon conclude that, for the best interests of the mem-
bers of their families and of the state, such bequests are an improper
use of their means.209
210
The movement against inherited wealth found other supporters.
However, it was still some time before the policy made its way into a
serious political debate.
E. Enactment of the "Modern" Estate Tax
By the turn of the century, America embarked upon the beginning
of several decades of sweeping social and political change. The great
disparity in the concentration of wealth in America and the resulting con-
flict in fundamental American values provided the political will to make
these changes. Much like the recent "Occupy" protestors, late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century reformers sought a variety of changes aimed
at evening the playing field. The various reform movements largely re-
flected the attempt by the "little man" to impose some limits on the pow-
er of "big business." 2 11 The little man asked the government to step in
and ensure equality of opportunity. However, some perceived this as an
assault on achievement, success, and individualism. Although changes
were widely popular, opposition began to grow.
Reformers sought to regulate corrupt corporations, eradicate the
corrupting influences of alcohol and brothels, and break up large concen-
trations of wealth. Activists looked to the government as a mechanism
for enforcing social change, rather than as an impediment to it. Congress
established the Federal Trade Commission and passed the Clayton Anti-
207. Id.
208. Id. at 658.
209. Id.
210. See Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 235.
211. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 478.
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trust Act. In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act and the
Meat Inspection Act. In 1911, the Supreme Court used the 1890 Sherman
Antitrust Act to break up Standard Oil. In 1913, the Sixteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, allowing the federal government to impose an income
tax. These economic changes had a meaningful impact on America's
economic landscape.
Against this backdrop of change, talk soon turned to using a federal
tax in order to restrict inherited wealth. The proponents framed the ar-
gument in the same manner as did Paine and Jefferson, a frame that had
wide popular appeal but was now inherently flawed. In 1906, President
Theodore Roosevelt proposed
the adoption of some such scheme as that of a progressive tax on all
fortunes, beyond a certain amount, either given in life or devised or
bequeathed upon death to any individual-a tax so framed as to put it
out of the power of the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to
hand on more than a certain amount to any one individual. 212
Echoing Jefferson and Paine, Roosevelt continued to promote a tax to
regulate inheritances. In his 1907 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt
again framed the tax in terms of equality of opportunity.
The Government has the absolute right to decide as to the terms upon
which a man shall receive a bequest or devise from another, and this
point in the devolution of property is especially appropriate for the
imposition of a tax.
... A heavy progressive tax upon a very large fortune is in no way
such a tax upon thrift or industry as a like would be on a small for-
tune. No advantage comes either to the country as a whole or to the
individuals inheriting the money by permitting the transmission in
their entirety of the enormous fortunes which would be affected by
such a tax; and as an incident to its function of revenue raising, such
a tax would help to preserve a measurable equality of opportunity for
the people of the generations growing to manhood.213
This equality of opportunity frame caught on. In 1912, the Progres-
sive Party announced: "We believe in a graduated inheritance tax as a
national means of equalizing the holders of property." 2 14 The issue, how-
ever, was not without controversy. The debate generally turned on
whether inheritance taxes should be reserved to state governments.2 15
212. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 228.
213. Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1907), in H.R. Doc. No. 60-1, at
xxi (1907).
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215. Joseph J. Thorndike, A Century of Soaking the Rich: The Origins of the Federal Estate




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Opponents of the federal tax argued that it would impede the states' abil-
ity to raise much needed revenue.216 Congress twice rejected the imposi-
tion of a federal estate or inheritance tax: once in 1909 and again in
1913.217 But by 1916, things had changed.
Once again, America faced war. The First World War, and the
events surrounding it, naturally caused Americans' value focus to tempo-
rarily shift. President Woodrow Wilson declared that "[t]he world must
be made safe for democracy." 2 18 Making the world safe for democracy
was an expensive proposition. Anticipating that, the Ways and Means
219Committee began investigating how best to raise additional revenue.
The Committee reported, "No civilized nation ... collects so large a part
of its revenues through consumption taxes as does the United States, and
it is conceded by all that such taxes bear most heavily upon those least
able to pay them." 2 20 Thus, the Committee recommended a progressive
estate tax as one of several mechanisms to more fairly raise the needed
221money. Congress agreed and enacted the 1916 Revenue Act, which
imposed a federal estate tax that is largely credited as being the first
"permanent" federal estate tax.222
The 1916 tax shared many features with the current federal estate
tax and is often referred to as the first "modem" estate tax. The tax was
223
designed as an estate tax rather than an inheritance tax. As an estate
tax, the 1916 tax was assessed based on the value of the decedent's estate
224
as opposed to the value of any particular inheritance. Like the current
estate tax, the value of the estate was increased for certain lifetime trans-
fers made in contemplation of death, not intended to take effect at death,
or for inadequate consideration. 225 After taking into account certain ex-
emptions for funeral expenses, administrative expenses, debts, losses,
claims against the estate, and a general $50,000 exemption, the 1916 tax
was levied at progressive rates ranging from 1% to 10%.226
Some members of Congress might have been influenced by the
popular equality of opportunity frame. However, the 1916 tax was not
aimed at regulating inherited wealth. The primary reason Congress en-
acted the tax was the immediate need for additional revenue.227 In fact,
216. Id
217. Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 229.
218. Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress Requesting Declaration of War on Germany (Apr.
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with a maximum rate of 10%, the tax could not impact inherited wealth
in a meaningful way.22 8 Rates increased several times during the course
of World War I, but each time was in response to an increased need for
revenue. 2 29 Some members of congress who voted in favor of increased
rates may also have been looking to regulate inherited wealth, but that
was not the overarching legislative intent. 230 Nor was it the effect of the
estate tax legislation. 2 3 1 As World War I ended, legislators considered
whether to repeal or reduce the federal estate tax.232 Before the 1916 tax,
Americans largely assumed that an estate tax would only be used to raise
the additional revenue needed in times of crisis. 233 Although some politi-
cal groups had advocated using the tax to regulate inherited wealth,234
most Americans probably never viewed that proposal as a serious possi-
bility. In fact, the modem federal tax system was still very much in its
infancy. Congress was just beginning to fully explore its ability to regu-
late the states and their citizens through its taxing and spending powers.
F. Andrew Mellon and the Framing of the Opposition
When Congress reduced but did not repeal the 1916 tax at the con-
clusion of the war, some people began questioning the appropriateness of
the tax, and the modem debate began in full. The tenor of this debate was
different from prior debates. Wealth disparities remained high in the ear-
ly 1920s, and the idea of regulating inherited wealth retained popular
appeal.2 35 If anything, the war had only made the members of the "manu-
facturing aristocracy" even richer.236 Thus, advocates of reform were
237anxious to retain the economic reforms attained during the war. In
1924, Congress actually raised the top rate from 25% to 40%.238 Con-
gress additionally enacted a new gift tax to prevent evasion of estate tax
through inter vivos gifts. 239 Opponents of the tax were outraged.
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon called the rate increase "nation-
al suicide" 240 and immediately embarked upon a very public campaign to
repeal the tax in its entirety. 241 The estate tax was not Mellon's only ob-
228. See id.
229. LUCKEY, supra note 168, at 6-7; Eisenstein, supra note 168, at 231.
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jective. Congress soon repealed a number of the taxes enacted during the
war, repeals which largely benefitted the wealthy.242
Mellon was instrumental in framing the opposition's argument, and
that frame remains the prominent frame today. Mellon recognized that
when a business owner died, his estate might consist largely of stock in
the business.24 3 Forcing a sale of that stock in order to pay estate taxes
would cause the value of the stock to drop. The problem was described
as follows:
[I]f the estate should consist of corporation shares, then 40 percent of
those would have to be unloaded, perhaps on a market not at the time
prepared to absorb them. There then might not merely be a loss to the
heirs but also an unwarranted harm might be done the company in-
volved by having a large block of stock poured into a nonreceptive
market. Other and quite innocent stockholders might find their hold-
ings depreciated in value merely because the government was getting
out its death due.244
Although this aspect of Mellon's argument seems plausible, many ex-
perts contend that it is fundamentally flawed from a legal standpoint245
and unsupported by economic data.246 Mellon's conflict of interest in the
matter was obvious. Mellon's hatred of estate and inheritance taxes part-
ly resulted from a rather unusual and widely publicized case involving
the death of Mellon's friend, wealthy industrialist Henry Clay Frick.247
The administration of Frick's estate was incredibly complicated for rea-
sons largely unrelated to the federal estate tax. Mellon believed that sell-
ing assets in Frick's estatein order to pay estate taxes unduly flooded the
market with a supply in excess of demand.24 8 Mellon repeatedly pointed
to this highly publicized case in support of his economic theory.249 How-
ever, the decline in value of the assets in Frick's estate after his death
was more likely a result of a depressed national economy than an excess
supply occasioned from a single estate. 25 0
Mellon was not alone in challenging the estate tax, but he did lead
the charge. Mellon grasped the problem with the way proponents framed
the issue.
242. See id; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes
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The social necessity for breaking up large fortunes in this country
does not exist. Very wisely our forefathers declined to implant in this
country the principle of primogeniture under which the eldest son
alone inherited and kept the properties intact. Under our American
law, it is customary for estates to be divided equally among the chil-
dren; and in a few generations any single large fortune is split into
many moderate inheritances. As a usual thing, the continuation of a
single fortune through several generations has been proven to be im-
possible. It is an often quoted saying that "there are three generations
from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves."
25'
The lasting aspects of Mellon's opposition are those framed by ref-
erence to core American values. Mellon argued that the tax would punish
activity and work.252 It would destroy the value of the property Ameri-
cans worked so hard to earn. 253 It was the enemy of the American dream.
Casting his argument in terms of equality, Mellon argued:
The theory upon which this country was founded is equality of op-
portunity. So long as a man uses his abilities within the bounds of the
moral sense of the community, monetary success is not a crime, but
on the contrary adds to the total wealth of the country and to an in-
crease in the standard of living as a whole. 254
Mellon was aided by the emerging criticisms of Marxism, painting
it as antithetical to American thought, thus playing to our nationalism
values. 255 For instance, Mellon argued that with an inheritance tax of
40%, "it would then be only two or three generations until private own-
ership of property would cease to exist."25 6 "Estate taxes, carried to an
excess, in no way differ from the methods of the revolutionists in Rus-
sia. 
257
In the wake of the Great Depression, however, even Mellon capitu-
lated.258 The Depression reduced income tax revenues while also increas-
ing the need for revenue to finance new projects.259 Faced with that prob-
lem, Mellon himself advocated for an increase in the estate tax rate.260
Although ultimately unsuccessful in repealing the estate tax, Mellon and
his colleagues were successful in framing opposition to the tax in terms
of core American values.
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G. Subsequent Developments
The federal estate tax underwent many changes in the following
years. In anticipation of the Second World War, Congress raised estate
taxes in order to finance military development.261 Congress raised rates
again after America's entry into the war in response to revenue de-
mands.262 Beginning in 1976, the tax underwent major revisions aimed at
modernizing the assessment and collection of taxes.263 In the end, eco-
nomics research supported Mellon's "shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves in
three generations" contention. 264 But that economic reality was lost amid
the political rhetoric of family farms and ensuring equality of opportuni-
ty.
VI. REFRAMING THE ISSUE
The current public federal estate tax debate remains relatively un-
changed. The men in your pop quiz, along with numerous other politi-
cians and public figures, are irresponsible in the way they perpetuate this
debate. Both sides of the argument are based upon "facts" that have not
existed in more than ninety years. Yet America faces the largest wealth
gap it has seen since the 1920s.2 65 That fact will undoubtedly shape poli-
tics and political debate for the next several years. We know from history
that when that situation occurs, the "result has been a political realign-
ment that tilted power and policy at least modestly away from the rich
and big business." 266
The Progressive Era of the 1900s is a prime example of that phe-
nomenon. America moved from an agrarian society to a manufacturing
society, and that change, not inherited wealth, fundamentally altered the
distribution of wealth in this country. The changes in the American
economy were not immediately accompanied by corresponding changes
in law and policy. By the 1920s, the disparity in wealth reached record
levels. 2 67 When that disparity became the focus of popular discourse, the
country was willing to support change. 268 Legislation and policies enact-
ed during the Progressive Era fundamentally changed the relationship
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between government and its citizens. 26 9 This theme has repeated itself
often in our history.270
We are in the midst of that repeated theme again. Our economy no
longer looks like it did in the 1900s or during the Revolution. But the
concentration of wealth and its relationship to democracy remains a con-
cern for many Americans.27 1 Inherited wealth no longer plays a meaning-
ful role in that very legitimate concern. Revolutionary Americans justifi-
ably believed that inherited wealth prevented equal opportunity to partic-
ipate in government because it fostered an elite ruling class of aristo-
crats.272 Eradicating the institutions that had promoted that system was an
important and meaningful decision. By the 1900s, inherited wealth, as
Mellon pointed out, was not the problem. Wealth disparity was high, but
inherited wealth was not the cause. As Tocqueville anticipated, equal
access to participate in the economy without restraint led to the devel-
opment of a "manufacturing aristocracy." Although aimed at redressing
that problem, the federal estate tax was not responsible for the changes
seen in following decades.
A federal estate tax will not affect wealth inequities in the coming
years. Money, and as a result political power, is again concentrated in the
hands of a few. 273 But our economy looks much different from what it
looked like in earlier eras. Today our "aristocrats" look different. They
are not the landed aristocracy or the manufacturing aristocracy of bygone
eras. Rather, today's "aristocrat" is the corporation and the political lob-
byist. 274 Through lobbying efforts, super PACs, 275 and the like, corpora-
tions have an incredible ability to affect politics and legislation, particu-
larly after the landmark Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion276 decision.277 The federal estate tax is ill suited to address those
problems and it is certainly ill suited to affect how much wealth and, in
turn, political power corporations hold.
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That does not mean the estate tax is irrelevant. Many public figures
and politicians will continue to debate the estate tax in the context of
wealth disparity and will continue to utilize the same flawed frames of
the past and they will base their frames in "facts" that no longer exist.
Perpetuating the flawed issue framing of the past century is irresponsible
and destructive because it prevents us from considering the real opportu-
nities afforded by the tax. If properly refrained by both sides of the de-
bate, the estate tax debate could be productive. In the aftermath of war
and economic collapse, America is again in the throes of a financial cri-
sis. The public is at odds as to how or if the government should raise
additional revenue. The federal estate tax, if properly reframed, could
play a meaningful role in that debate.
As Americans, we value efficiency and practicality.27 8 In practice,
that means "seeking the fastest and least costly means of achieving a
goal."2 79 Efficiency and practicality are not always at the top of our per-
sonal or collective value hierarchies-but in the context of budget deci-
sions, they are values that probably should be. Where do we find the
revenue needed to address current government needs? A fast, inexpen-
sive, and effective solution seems ideal.280 When facing the need for ex-
tra revenue in times of war or financial crisis in our early years, we as a
nation turned to federal estate and inheritance taxes.281' These taxes were
fairly modest and applied to a wide array of estates. 2 8 2 They were not
intended to cause social change283 and they did not seem to unduly bur-
den taxpayers. They were effective and practical. These taxes repeatedly
provided a revenue safety net. Perhaps for those reasons, they were ini-
tially uncontroversial. By helping to finance, among other exigencies, the
Civil War, World War I, the New Deal, and World War II, the taxes un-
doubtedly helped America accomplish meaningful and important change.
But the taxes themselves were not the instrument of that change. They
were merely a practical and efficient mechanism for financing that
change.
Not until politicians refrained the estate tax debate as a struggle be-
tween two compelling and irreconcilable American values-values on
which the estate tax really had no bearing-did the tax become contro-
versial. By moving from a tax whose primary goal was to raise revenue
to a tax aimed at battling income inequality by curbing the accumulation
of wealth across generations, we made the tax itself so controversial and
divisive that using it to raise revenue proved challenging. And yet, the
tax did not, and perhaps could not, ever achieve its redistributive and
278. Cerulo, supra note 19, at 352.
279. Id.
280. See Repetti, supra note 80, at 1495.
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regulatory goals of wealth distribution. Nor did the tax cause the litany of
harms alleged by its opponents. Our politics were so shaped by argu-
ments that were improperly framed at the outset that we kept missing the
real potential of the federal estate tax. Rather than considering how best
to use the tax to raise revenue in a manner that is efficient, administrable,
and equitable, the debate centered on issues that are not meaningfully
impacted by the tax. The federal estate tax currently provides a small, but
meaningful, portion of federal revenue. Not only could the tax continue
to do so, but if we reframe the debate in proper terms, we could rational-
ly consider using it to provide an even greater-and much needed-
source of revenue in the future.

